Source: "Whaling in the North Atlantic - Economic
and Political Perspectives," Ed. Gudrun Petursdottir, University of
Iceland, 1997, ISBN 9979-54-213-6. Proceedings of a conference held in Reykjavik
on March 1st, 1997, organized by the Fisheries Research Institute and the
High North Alliance.
Author: Steinar Andresen The Fridtjof Nansen Institute, Oslo, Norway
SCOPE AND PURPOSE
This is a short policy paper without much academic pretensions. It contains a lot of speculations and thoughts about the future of the whaling issue, linked especially to the role of NAMMCO. Although it is impossible to discuss NAMMCO without touching upon the role of the IWC, it will not be dealt with in detail. Moreover, I will not discuss the formalities, objectives, history etc. of both the IWC and the NAMMCO, as this is considered to fall outside the scope of this paper. Although this is a policy paper, it builds to some extent upon my previous research mainly within the project on “The Effectiveness and Implementation of International Environmental Commitments.”1 I have written a chapter in a forthcoming book from the project on “The Making and Implementation of Whaling Policies: Does Participation Make a Difference?” where I analyze i.a. the whaling policies of Iceland and Norway. A few broad observations from this study are utilized as a basis for the present discussion on NAMMCO.
Concerning the Nordic countries, Norway and Icelands will be emphasized as the two key players in this connection.2 I will start out by discussing briefly the significance of the Nordic countries in international resource and environmental cooperation in general, before turning to their positions on the whaling issue. In the last section I will turn to NAMMCO; what has it achieved and what are the future perspectives?
THE NORDIC SETTING: RHETORIC AND REALITY
In meetings within the Nordic Council and at other similar Nordic events, emphasis is often placed on interests these countries share in international affairs, not least on environmental issues. Although this rhetoric is still quite common, in real terms it is more a bygone phenomenon. The Nordic countries could largely act as a block during the 1970s and most of the 1980s, when international environmental agreements were rather “toothless”; they were of a declaratory nature and had little or no practical effect for the member countries. There were few, if any, expenses connected with being “green”. Considering the Nordic reputation for being rather advanced in this area as well as their inclination to support “good causes” this was an issue well suited to presentation as a common Nordic concern.
However, over the course of the last ten years or so, this has changed dramatically as many international environmental agreements have become much more concrete and demanding; real interests and real behaviour are often affected if the agreements are to be complied with. This has strongly affected the Nordic unity since they have different material interests in many respects, which often makes Nordic alliances more the exception than the rule. The picture is not idyllic regarding fisheries either; as most notably exemplified by the conflict between Norway and Iceland. This conflict is so profound that it seems to have some spill-over-effect to the whaling issue; it becomes difficult to cooperate in this area as long as the fisheries conflicts are unresolved. Reducing Nordic unity even more is the fact that Denmark, Sweden and Finland have become EU members while Norway and Iceland have not. While the EU is playing an increasing role as a decisionmaking arena, the Nordic arena is losing much of its significance. Nevertheless, what has been accomplished within the Nordic setting should not be forgotten, i.a. in relation to the labour market and the open borders. Moreover, the role of norms, culture and history should be remembered. In such a perspective, the Nordic arena may still have a function. It provides an opportunity for discussion and exchange of ideas, though other actors and arenas usually need to be involved when decisions on management issues are being taken.3
THE NORDIC COUNTRIES AND THE WHALING ISSUE:
A BROAD PICTURE
Whaling is considered both an environmental and a resource management issue. Everybody familiar with this issue over the last decade or so knows that many people conceive the whaling issue as being primarily environmental. This is captured in the following quote by one of the most prominent persons known for turning the whaling issue into an environmental one: “saving the whale is for millions of people a crucial test of their political ability to halt environmental destruction” (Holt 1985:12) (emphasis added). Thus, the NAMMCO members are at odds with the majority of IWC members in regarding whaling as a question of sustainable harvest of a living marine resource. The administrative basis of the whaling issue in the Nordic countries illustrates the split in how the issue is perceived. As pointed out by Ivarsson (1994: 180), in Iceland, Norway, Greenland and the Faroe Islands whaling issues are under the Fisheries Administration. In the other Nordic countries they are a part of the Environmental Administration.
There may not be many issues among the Nordic countries where the spread in positions and preferences is more widespread than on the whaling issue. In fact, the main positions of the whole body of members of the IWC are represented among the five Nordic countries. If a continuum ranging from protection, conservation, aboriginal whaling to commercial whaling is conceived, the following broad picture would emerge:
| FINLAND | SWEDEN | DENMARK | (ICELAND) NORWAY |
| Protection | Conservation | Aboriginal whaling | Commercial whaling |
Both Finland and Sweden are solidly placed within the anti-whaling block and they both joined the IWC when it became fashionable to do so at the end of the 1970s and early 1980’s. Like so many of the other newly-recruited IWC members, they had previously not had any interest or involvement in the issue. It appears however, that more recently some nuances between the two can be perceived; while Finland is an unambiguous (yet very passive) protectionist country, Sweden is a more active player and seemingly more open to playing the role of a broker. The positions of Finland and Sweden are not too difficult to explain. This is a fairly simple issue for them just as it is for the large majority of the non-whaling nations of the IWC. As no material interests are involved, anti-whaling is a simple way to earn points in the international “green beauty contest”. In the eyes of most observers it looks good internationally and, not least, gives the decision-makers some easy points from the domestic ENGO communities.4 There are so many issues where it is difficult to be green, so why not grab the opportunities that exist? In my opinion this is a line of reasoning that all countries make use of when given the opportunity, not least Norway. Few countries are better at waving the green flag when no material interests are involved. As such, there is nothing wrong in using such opportunities for “symbolic policy”. However, you have to be prepared for meeting the circumstance when you are the one with material stakes involved, and it may be painful to see that a large majority of “have-nots” vote you down.
At the other extreme of the continuum is Norway, the only country conducting
commercial whaling - within the framework of the IWC. Iceland is put in
brackets, as not being in quite the same category as Norway, neither conducting
whaling nor being a member of the IWC. Nevertheless, there is little doubt
that Iceland is positive to commercial whaling. In what may seem to be
a difficult middle position is Denmark. On the one hand it is against commercial
whaling, having a fairly green environmental profile to consider. On the
other hand it has to consider the interests of Greenland and the Faroe
Islands, which have very different attitudes towards the whaling issue,
demonstrated by their memberships in NAMMCO. Although the situation is
made somewhat easier by the fact that these two actors have sovereign jurisdiction
over their living resources, it is neverthless Denmark that is the state
representative in the IWC. However, as long as the IWC continues to endorse
aboriginal whaling and not commercial whaling, Denmark can wave the green
flag, and still be a whaling nation.
Although interests vary strongly, the Nordic countries have still found
it useful to have deliberations on the issue. Thus, since the middle of
the 1980s, the Nordic IWC Commissioners have had a separate meeting prior
to the yearly IWC meetings. Moreover, in 1992 a report was commissioned
by the Nordic Council to identify the positions of the Nordic countries
on the whaling issue. My impression is that Sweden and Finland appear more
sympathetic towards Iceland and Norway when the question is being discussed
within the Nordic cooperative framework; language and attitudes seem to
vary somewhat, depending on the setting. However, if there is a true shift
in the Swedish position towards the middleground, and this is not only
linked to shift of personell, Sweden may have an important role to play
in the future. What is needed in the IWC, if it is to get out of its current
stalemate, is some countries that truly stand out as brokers between the
antagonists.
The two most important countries in this setting are Iceland and Norway. Here I will start out by summarizing a few factual observations on the whaling policies of these two countries in recent years .
As we can see there are striking similarities between the two countries, but there are some very important differences as well.5 With this as a point of departure, what kind of policies will these two countries pursue in the future, not least linked to the future development of NAMMCO?
NAMMCO: ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND FUTURE POTENTIALS
What has been accomplished?
How do we judge NAMMCO so far, what has been achieved along different dimensions?
It is a fairly new organization and experience from other international
organizations and regimes indicates that one cannot expect much of substance
to happen within such a short time-span (Andresen & Wettestad, 1995).
In a comparative perspective it seems to be quite successful, as quite
a bit has been accomplished on the scientific side, and a lot of procedures
i.a. linked to management and inspection are already in place.6 Without
doubt it has also had a positive effect regarding confidence-building and
learning between the members. Thus, judged by these rather “soft”
criteria it seems to have been fairly sucecssful.
The question is what is going to happen next. Will NAMMCO be a “procedural success” but an empty shell from a management perspective, at least regarding whales under IWC jurisdiction? This in part depends on what the members of NAMMCO want it to be. If they want to stick to the present “scientific, knowledge-builiding and procedural” strategy and not interfere with substantial matters within IWC competence, things may be fairly easy and it will certainly be useful. However, things get more difficult if some of the members want to pursue a more ambitious strategy. As I am not a lawyer I will refrain from going into legal details regarding the relation between the Law of the Sea Convention, IWC and NAMMCO. I will stick to the policy side of the question, and it may well be the most decisive aspect in the final end.
The scope of membership
A critical question for the future of NAMMCO concerns the scope of membership.
As it stands now, the parties may be too few to represent a viable management
alternative as Norway and Iceland are the only two independent state-members.
The membership of the Faroe Islands and Greenland certainly adds legitimacy
and as such they are important, but it does not fundamentally alter the
fact that there are only two state members. Before speculating on what
the two key members want to use NAMMCO for, let us look at the possibilities
for a broader state participation. There are several states attending NAMMCO
meetings as observers.7 Among these Russia and Japan are potentially new
members.
One of the safest bets that can be made about Russia´s future policy is that it is unpredictable. The political situation is in turmoil; with cross-cutting cleavages between the various segments of the bureaucratic, political, business and military communities. One indication that “rational politics” can not be expected is reflected in the fact that the Russian Ministry of Environment was recently closed down - irrespective of the enormous environmental challenges facing the country. The severe difficulties that Norway as well as other western countries have faced in dealing with the various environmental challenges in Russia also show that Russia is no easy counterpart to deal with these days. Given this setting, the issue of whaling can hardly be expected to be given very high priority.
Nevertheless, let us speculate from a “rational perspective” on what Russia might do. Over the last few years Russia does not seem to have given very high priority to the IWC. Delegations have been very small and those sent do not appear to be high ranking or representing the more powerful segments in the Russian society. Moreover, Russia has not been given much support by the IWC majority. First there is the question of massive underreporting of catches by the previous Soviet Union. (Stoett, 1995). This also illustrates the internal strife on the issue in Russia. At the last IWC meeting in 1996, Russia was not allowed to take the aboriginal quota of 5 grey whales. Later on, Russia declared that it would disregard the IWC in this respect. It is my understanding that these whales may be far more important for these aboriginal people as a source of food than may be the case with other aboriginal whaling. In such a perspective, the ‘“green” arguments about conservation and protection of whales conveyed by the IWC majority cannot be expected to carry much weight in Russia. Conversely, it may be far more provocative to the relatively poor Russia than to the other (previous) and present whaling nations. In short, the above arguments indicate that IWC may not be considered very important to Russia. However, it should be recalled that apart from Norway, Russia is the only country that objected to the moratorium. Moreover, in contrast to most previous whaling countries Russia did not stop whaling due to pressure from the US and/or the environmental NGOs, but due to economic considerations. Thus, in the same manner as Norway, in legal terms, no-one can stop Russia should it want to conduct commercial whaling within the IWC.
Assuming that Russia wants to carry out some kind of whaling, will it do so as a small and “harassed” minority in the IWC or would it rather prefer to build a possible alternative to the IWC through full membership in NAMMCO or within some other alternative organization? It is my guess that the Russians have not decided on these questions yet, so I will refrain from further speculation. Just a small note in case Russia does become a NAMMCO member. As a point of departure such an important country certainly would broaden the NAMMCO basis and increase its legitimacy. However, with Russia on board, the attack on NAMMCO from the environmental movement might increase considerably. Although all previous Antarctic whaling nations should realize that they are marked by “the shadow of the past”, this shadow may be particularly dark for Russia, considering the previous massive cheating that has been unravelled. In this perspective, a Russian membership may not have advantages only.
These last arguments do not apply to Canada. Canadian membership would increase the legitimacy of NAMMCO considerably. Canada left the IWC a long time ago and has considerable interests both as a sealing nation and as a small scale (aboriginal) whaling nation. It is also rumoured that Canada will in fact join NAMMCO before the next NAMMCO meeting in May this year (1997). The legal position of the aboriginals is strong in Canada. Considering the strong position of aboriginals in NAMMCO, a membership might seem a logical step. A key factor in the Canadian calculation on whether to join NAMMCO or not, is bound to deal with what effect it might have on the relationship to the USA. The Canadian - USA relations are currently quite strained, both on more general political issues (i.a. Cuba) as well as more specifically on the issue of marine mammals. The question is what effect these strained relations will have on the Canadian consideration about whether or not to join NAMMCO; should further escalations be avoided, or is there nothing to lose by membership? It may well be that Canada, a significant builder of international institutions in the North, would enjoy belonging to an organization dealing with northern affairs, that did not have the US as a member. So far it seems Canada has experienced the same as Norway has; there are threats and certifications but it does not come to sanctions; - would the same thing happen if Canada joined NAMMCO? I will get back to the US position towards NAMMCO in the final section.
Management body or ‘bargaining chip’?
How many and which countries are going to join NAMMCO - if any - is certainly
an important question for the future of NAMMCO; a new momentum may be created
or a notion of stagnation may become apparent. However, irrespective of
this question, what do the two main countries, Norway and Iceland want
with NAMMCO? Does one or both of them really want it as a basis for managing
whaling, or is it more of a “bargaining chip” in a broader game
with other players?
To my knowledge, Iceland took the initiative to create what later on became NAMMCO. Why was this move made? It may be linked to the fact that Iceland was the first country to really take a serious beating within the IWC. While Norway was still a reluctant and cautious player, taking time to elaborate a strategy on the issue, Iceland was well underway with a scientific offensive in 1986. Iceland got much credit for for the scientific work in the IWC Scientific Commmittee, but politically not much was achieved. Against this backdrop it makes sense to start working for an alternative management regime; either as a bargaining chip to increase chances of getting your policies accepted, or to have it as a real fallback position in case of failure.
When it became clear to Iceland in 1991 that the rational scientific strategy would bear no fruits in the IWC, it may have seemed logical to leave the IWC and put all the apples in the NAMMCO basket.
Norwegian small-scale whalers as well as the Fishermen’s Organization were happy with the Icelandic initiative. The Norwegian authorities also went along with the idea, partly as a means to pacify the strong opposition from these domestic actors towards what they saw as a rather defensive Norwegian position in the IWC at the time and partly to have more options available for future policies. However, with the benefit of hindsight we now know that the main Norwegian strategy was to start commercial whaling within the IWC. The same year as NAMMCO was created, Norway declared that commercial whaling would start within the framework of the IWC. Thus, as it turned out, for Norway NAMMCO has been essentially a bargaining chip. How important this card has been, especially in the bilateral negotiations with the USA, is not clear, but it has probably served a useful purpose, provided that the Norwegian threat of relying on NAMMCO if it did not get its way in the IWC was credible. This is not to say that NAMMCO has been and still is valued as a very useful instrument for the purposes that it is set up to serve. As it stands now, however, at least from a pragmatic point of view, I can see little reason for Norway to try to alter the de facto functioning of NAMMCO. Why try something new and uncertain when you basically have it your way in the present regime? I would assume that there is some kind of tacit understanding between Norway and the US that unofficially Norwegian commercial whaling will be accepted as long as it takes place within the IWC. I am not sure this understanding would be valid if Norwegian whaling were to take place within NAMMCO.
This is in accord with the fact that Norway sees itself as a true “internationalist”, stressing the significance of law and order internationally. Being a small country this is generally in Norway´s interest. However poorly the IWC may be seen to function, as measured against what it was intended to be, or could have been, it is a fact that by the large majority of member states it is seen as the only legitimate international body for dealing with the whaling issue. These nations include the US, all the main EU states, most major western countries, including most Nordic countries. Conversely, I find it most probable that all these actors will view NAMMCO as illegitimate from a political perspective, irrespective of legal factors.
Although I believe this is the main calculation done by Norway until now, the picture is still not that simple. If the IWC majority continues to refute science as the basic management principle and continues to stall the implementation of procedures that may make commercial whaling possible, it may be difficult in the long run to continue spending time and resources on such an organization. In an “ideal world”, where there were only whales to consider, I am quite sure that Norway would leave the IWC, but the reality is not as simple as that.
What about Iceland? The future policies of Iceland will probably to some extent be linked to the NAMMCO membership issue, and the kind of expectations and preferences the new potential members bring with them. Nevertheless, I think the basic question not mainly concerns the development of NAMMCO but internal Icelandic policy: will Iceland resume commercial whaling? My impression is that Iceland does not really know, or maybe does not want to make a decison? It is a fact that although the question has been extensively discussed for 5-6 years by Government(s) as well as Parliament in different settings, no decision has been taken.
There seems to be more internal disagreement on this issue in Iceland than there was in Norway. Clearly, actions by the US and parts of the NGO community are expected if whaling is resumed; actions that may divide the Icelandic society, depending upon their strength and duration. In any case, Iceland has to find out what it wants to do; re-enter the IWC, work to strengthen NAMMCO or simply declare that whaling is no longer a viable alternative in view of the present international climate. The ‘wait and see strategy’ has now lasted so long that it seems high time to make some decisions.
SOME CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
The future of NAMMCO, the IWC, as well as increased whaling in general depends to a large extent on public opinion in western societies. Although the attitude towards whaling is not as negative as commonly perceived in anti-whaling countries like USA and UK (Freeman & Kellert, 1992), these countries probably have little to gain by changing their attitudes. Not least the NGO community will see to that. Nevertheless, public opinion tends to be cyclical, - the perception of marine mammals as special cretaures may also change; a few more perceived or real disatsers among livestock and other animals may be what it takes. It is also my impression that although the NGO community showing up at the annual IWC meetings shows no signs of decline, the issue is not quite as a ‘hot’ as it used to be. Moreover, an alternative NGO community, sympathetic to the whaling nations, parts of it highly skilled and with good understanding of the role of the media and politics, has succeeded in bringing more nuances into the picture. In short, it gets increasingly difficult both for politicians as well as for “green” NGOs to claim that whales as such are a threatened species, not the least due to the increasingly clear and consensual scientific message.
Although these are some important trends, they may be small comfort to those hoping that things will happen fast. In the short run, the key to the future of the whaling issue lies in the hands of the USA. It seems that its position in the IWC has for various reasons been reduced somewhat recently, but the US is still the most dominant and powerful player. It is my impression that the US strongly supports the IWC as the only legitimate basis for the management of whales; NAMMCO will not be tolerated as a competitor to the IWC. If this is the opinion of the USA, it is important that it uses its influence to make the IWC into an organization where careful and scientific management of whales will become feasible. If not, the whaling issue may continue to cause conflicts among otherwise like-minded nations. In a world where there are so many real problems relating both to the environment and the management of living resources, that should not be necessary. However, this may be a rather rational perspecive, and as politics are often irrational, the outcome is likely to be uncertain.
Acknowledgements:
I want to thank Alf Håkon Hoel, University of Tromsø, for
useful comments on an earlier version of this paper.
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