".... To be sure, whales are not human, but are they "less" than human? The mind set that exults in the killing of whales and the "sports" hunting of endangered wildlife species overlaps with the mind set that accepts genocide of "inferior" human beings. Conversely, the extension of rights to whales resonates deeply with the historical-legal extensions of equal rights to women and to minority groups. We believe that the phrase "human rights" is only superficially species chauvinistic. In a profound sense, whales and some other sentient mammals are entitled to human rights or at least - humanist rights - to the most fundamental entitlements that we regard as part of the humanitarian tradition. They are entitled to those fundamental rights not because they are "less" than human but because they are "different" from humans in various respects that do not affect or qualify the rights in question. In this article we argue only for extending the single most fundamental of all human rights - the right to life - to whales.
Finally, let us consider a philosophically intermediate position between according rights to whales and abusing them. One might contend that so long as whales are not intentionally maltreated, there is no need to consider them as rights holders. This position is an echo of David Hume's speculation that creatures otherwise like us but lacking the power to harm us can at most hope to be treated mercifully but cannot expect to be treated justly. But, as Allen Buchanan points out, such a position would deny rights to persons who are unable to contribute to society, such as those who from birth are severely and permanently incapacitated. Our moral obligations to others cannot now be grounded on our expectation of future help from them. Even so, we cannot now know what potential future benefit to persons the continued existence of whales might afford. Medical science is replete with examples of cures derived from animals and plants, many of which seemed useless and some of which were at the point of extinction when the therapeutic discovery was made. Yet morality cannot be a matter of self-interested or prudential calculation, but is rather a deontological obligation that we owe to others even at the possibility of a net cost to ourselves. Unless we acknowledge that sentient creatures such as whales are right holders - even if those rights are limited to a few fundamental ones - we open the door to acknowledging the propriety of a future technological development that would assure the "painless" mass slaughter of whales, arguably without mistreating or abusing them. The philosophical intermediate position, on analysis, is inconsistent with our moral tradition."