The 1982 decision to implement a "temporary" general moratorium on all commercial whaling is the basis of the contentious situation that runs the risk of self-destructing the IWC. The moratorium has been in effect since 1986.

On several occasions, in the years before 1982, the Scientific Committee of the IWC advised against a blanket moratorium and emphasised that prudent management requires regulation of individual stocks.

In 1982, the conflict level within the Scientific Committee was so high that it could not discuss the content of any paper. Some members recommended a blanket moratorium while others repeated the need for managing stocks individually.

Since 1972 several proposals to adopt a general moratorium were put forward to the IWC but they failed to achieve the necessary three-quarters majority.

Until the 1970s, the number of IWC-members was fairly stable at about 14-16, but increased to 39 in just a few years. In the period 1979 to 1982, 19 new states joined the IWC. The new members were the Seychelles, Oman, Switzerland, China, Costa Rica, Dominica, India, Jamaica, the Philippines, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Uruguay, Antigua, Belize, Egypt, Kenya, Monaco, Senegal and West Germany.

As many as ten states attended their first IWC-meeting in 1982. This influx of new members made it possible to achieve the necessary majority for the moratorium, which was adopted with 25 votes in favour, 7 against and 5 abstentions.

Greenpeace recruits anti-whaling nations into IWC for a coup d'etat
The Seychelles played a key role in bringing about the decision to introduce the moratorium, and that country put the proposal for the moratorium forward. The country's delegation included Sidney Holt, a central figure in the Save-the-Whale movement. He was chairman of Greenpeace UK for a short period, and has been employed by the International Fund for Animal Welfare (IFAW) for the past ten years. Together with the then director of Greenpeace International, David McTaggart, he played a central role in efforts to recruit new member states to the IWC (1);(2).

"The whale savers targeted poor nations plus some small newly independent ones like Antigua and St. Lucia. They drafted the required membership documents for submission to the U.S. State Department. ... (T)he operation added at least a dozen new member countries to the commission's membership" (2).

"Conservationists began to lobby sympathetic countries and draft them into the IWC fold. The money for those countries' IWC fees, and support for their delegations, often came from private funds as politically astute conservationists sought to change the IWC from within. The goal was to create a three-quarter majority of anti-whaling nations" (3).

Greenpeace compared this process with a coup d'etat; "environmental and animal welfare groups (...) carried out what amounted to a coup d'etat in the International Whaling Commission" (4).

In addition to efforts to change the member structure, efforts were also invested in the Scientific Committee. David Day, who is a strong anti-whaler, claims that "[i]nside the IWC, conservationists were at work within the commission's primary defence system: its Scientific Committee. (...) The presence of the IWC Scientific Committee scientists not dependent on the whaling industry itself for employment was of major importance in the war" (1).

The South-African scientist, Dr. Butterworth, says that the conflict within the Scientific Committee was caused by a hidden agenda to end all whaling based on an animal rights philosophy: "The terms of the convention have required that this debate be conducted in a scientific guise, so that these hidden agendas have had to be played out in the scientific committee." (5)

When the Scientific Committee was unable to agree on various whale estimates this indicated a high degree of uncertainty. Employing the precautionary approach, this uncertainty furnished the IWC-commissioners with a justification for voting in favour of the whaling moratorium.

Reactions to the "temporary" ban
The moratorium was supposed to be temporary, from 1986 to 1990. The actual decision says: "This provision will be kept under review, based upon the best scientific advice, and by 1990 at the latest the Commission will undertake a comprehensive assessment of the effects of this decision on whale stocks and consider modification of this provision and the establishment of other catch limits."

It was largely due to this wording that Iceland decided not to lodge an objection to the decision. Iceland assumed that the moratorium would be reassessed by 1990, and that quotas would then be set on the basis of new, more reliable information on whale stocks. This did not happen and Iceland left the IWC in 1992 in protest, before it returned in 2002 with a reservation to the moratorium.

Iceland, Norway and Russia are exempted from the moratorium as they maintain reservations to it.

The IWC has neglected the promise that the moratorium was meant to only be a temporary measure from 1986 to 1990, and maintains the moratorium contrary to scientific advice.

High North Alliance opinion on the moratorium:
The High North Alliance is of the opinion that the moratorium should be considered null, void, outdated and illegal. The moratorium was adopted without any scientific justification, and thus against the letter and spirit of the Convention. Furthermore, the moratorium was supposed a temporary measure only, which is also reflected in the actual wording. Thus the moratorium became outdated in 1990. The High North Alliance therefore believes that any member to the IWC is free to engage in commercial whaling, also in the case that these members do not maintain a reservation to the moratorium.

Further reading:
"... a move guaranteed to undermine the IWC's raison d'etre .... "
Greenpeace on Whaling, Sealing and Campaigning
The not so peaceful world of Greenpeace (Forbes, 1991)

Sources:
(1) David Day, The Whale War, 1992 (and 1987, first edition).
(2) Leslie Spencer (with Jan Bollwerk and Richard D. Morais), "The not so peaceful world of Greenpeace", in Forbes, November11, 1991.
(3) Jeremy Cherfas, The Hunting of the Whale: A tragedy that must end, 1988.
(4) Dean M. Wilkinson, "The use of domestic measures to enforce international whaling agreements: A critical perspective", in Denver Journal of International Law and Policy, vol. 17, no. 2, pp. 271-91, 1989.
(5) Douglas Butterworth, "Science and sentimentality", in Nature, vol. 357, pp. 532-4, 1992.